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I

2008, the trial of Thomas Dyilo
Lubanga was originally expected to commence at the
International Criminal Court (ICC),1 five years after the
Court commenced operations. The ICC’s 2007 budget was $146
million (93 million euros), leaving it still some way behind
the $1.2 billion (762 million euros) and $1 billion (635 million euros) spent by the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR) respectively in their ten years of operation,
a cost of between $10–15 million (6.4–9.5 million euros) per
accused.
At the same time, two hybrid tribunals are moving forward.
In late 2008, the trial of Kaing Guek Eav is due to commence at
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC),
more than two years after the Court commenced operations. In
March 2008 the ECCC presented a budget to donors requesting an additional $115 million (73 million euors) on top of the
$56 million (35.5 million euors) originally budgeted for three
years. With only five accused, a budget of $180 million (114
million euros) would allocate $36 million (23 million euros)
per accused. Meanwhile, the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina
(BiH) in Sarajevo is running a large number of internationalized
trials at $709,000 (450,000 euros) per trial, which is predicted to
reduce to $236,000 (150,000 euros) over the next two years.
It is not clear why there are such vast differences in the cost
of different tribunals, all of which officially meet international
standards of fairness. Excessive costs and delays limit the ability
of courts to try a broad range of people, leading to an element
of arbitrariness where an individual will only be tried if it is
probable that the budget of the court permits it. The delays also
create a conflict between the positive obligation of the State
to investigate violations of the right to life and the right of the
accused to trial in a reasonable time.

thousands of individual incidents, often with far less resources
than would be dedicated to a simple murder in a rich country,
often trying to undertake investigations in remote areas, years
after the events, and probably in a foreign language.
This is not a new problem. Over 15,000 war crimes trials
took place in Europe and Asia following the Second World
War. The scale and speed of those investigations is remarkable,
producing thousands of statements and tons of evidence within
a few months, followed by trials that took a week or so. The
relatively high acquittal rates indicate that the tribunals focused
strongly on the legal and factual issues before them.
The trials undertaken by the military authorities of the
United Kingdom (UK) in Asia took place in Singapore, Kuala
Lumpur, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Burma, and North Borneo. The
legal basis and political structures for the war crimes trials were
negotiated in October 1944, with the Regulations for the Trial
of War Criminals of June 1945, outlining the legal basis for the
trials within the military justice system.2
The targets set were daunting to say the least. In October
1945, UK Attorney General Hartley Shawcross stated that 500
trials should be concluded by July 1946, i.e. within nine months.
By December a total of 17 investigative teams were created,
mainly utilizing agents of the Special Operations Executive.
They collected 35,963 statements from ex-prisoners of war,
together with civilian statements, placing advertisements in
newspapers to appeal for information.
Trials started in Singapore in January 1946, and by May
8,900 suspects were in custody. However, delays started, and a
lack of translators and Japanese defense counsel made it impossible to meet the targets. The estimates were revised, and the
completion deadline was extended by 12 months to July 1947.
A total of 919 individuals were tried for war crimes before the
UK authorities.

n the second half of

The Cost of Justice

Fifty Years On: The Special Panels for Serious
Crimes in East Timor

War crimes trials are expensive. In a well-developed national
criminal justice system, a murder trial often takes hundreds
of police hours to investigate, leading to a trial that may take
months. Terrorist cases, organized crime, and white-collar crime
cases are more complex and may cost millions of dollars.
Crimes against humanity are by definition widespread or systematic, so the investigative authorities must find evidence for

The United Nations (UN) Security Council created the
Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East Timor — with the
creation of the UN Transitional Authority for East Timor
(UNTAET) — by Resolution 1272 of October 1999. UNTAET
gave the Dili District Court exclusive jurisdiction for trials
involving genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.
By June 2000 50 individuals were in custody. In contrast to
the annual budgets of about $100 million (63.5 million euros)
then allocated to the ICTY and ICTR, the Special Panels 2001
budget was $6.3 million (4 million euros), $6 million (3.8 million euros) of which was allocated to the prosecution, with
only $300,000 (190,000 euros) for the rest of the court.3 The
2003–2005 budget was $14,358,600 (9,116,340 euros), even
less when divided annually.4
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State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina

assistance to create a court to try the Khmer Rouge. Seven years
of tortuous negotiations followed, with the UN withdrawing
from the process but then being forced back to the negotiation
table by the UN General Assembly.8
The Group of Experts Report issued by the UN in 1999 identified a number of concerns regarding trial operations. In particular, it warned of the weakness of the Cambodian legal system,
concluding that “domestic trials organized under Cambodian
law are not feasible and should not be supported financially by
the United Nations.” 9 The experts commented that any tribunal
for the Khmer Rouge would “involve a significant commitment
of resources” 10 and warned that:
“any UN tribunal . . . will be established somewhat slowly
and then only trudge through its caseload. The Group thus
recommends that the UN, building upon its experience
with the prior tribunals, undertake all necessary measures
to expedite the establishment of the court. These should
certainly include exemptions from competitive bidding
and, most important, from limitations on secondment to
take effect immediately upon the court’s legal establishment. The budgetary approval process also needs to be
streamlined.” 11

Krešo Lučić, accused of crimes against humanity of torture, imprisonment and other inhumane acts, stands trial at the War Crimes Chamber
in Bosnia.

Substantial organizational issues arose regarding staffing,
translation, court management and the provision of defense lawyers. One highly informed commentator concluded:

The original budget for the ECCC was $56 million (35.5
million euros), with $13 million (8.25 million euros) provided
by the Government of Cambodia and $43 million (27.3 million
euros) provided by the international community through voluntary donations. The entire process was supposed to take three
years, commencing in June 2006 and finishing in June 2009.
Whilst the donor community made pledges covering the UN
portion, the Cambodian government was not able to produce the
money it pledged and sought donor assistance, which still left a
shortfall of over $4 million (=c 2.5 million).12
During 2007 it became clear that the ECCC had no hope of
completing the trials within the original timescale and budget.
In March 2008 a new request for funding was presented to
donors, extending the lifespan of the Court until March 2011 and
requesting an additional $115 million (73 million euros), taking
the total budget to almost $170 million (108 million euros).
With only five accused, this created a cost per trial of $36 million (23 million euros).

“…the performance of the UN in East Timor represents a
virtual text-book case of how not to create, manage, and
administer a ‘hybrid’ tribunal. Handicapped from the beginning by a debilitating lack of resources, an unclear mandate, inadequate recruitment, ineffective management by a
peacekeeping mission that had other priorities, and above all
a lack of political will both at UN headquarters and at the
mission level, the Special Panels struggled to meet the many
challenges they faced.” 5

During the tribunal’s creation, problems arose due to hiring
personnel with little experience in court management, and not
hiring a chief administrative officer. Simultaneous translation
equipment arrived late in the process, and even then the interpreters were not trained to a standard sufficient to use them. The
lack of transcriptions of court proceedings led to problems for
appeals. Case and file management systems did not arrive until
the very end of the process. Witnesses and accused were often
transported in the same buses to get to court. Critically, initial
attempts to use local defense lawyers against international prosecutors failed, leading to concerns as to the fairness of some
convictions.6 Many concluded that the process was ‘deeply
flawed’ and that trying to achieve justice on the cheap “does an
injustice to those individuals convicted without a fair trial and
undermines the very standards of the justice and the rule of law
that the tribunals are supposed to advance.”7

The War Crimes Chamber of the Court of
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Whilst the negotiations for Cambodia continued, another
hybrid court came into being in Sarajevo. UN Security Council
in Resolution 1503 of August 2003 called for the completion
strategies of the ICTY and ICTR to be facilitated by the transfer of lower level cases to be tried in domestic courts. This
became known as the “Rule 11bis” process. Consultations were
undertaken in 2003 between the ICTY and the Office of the
High Representive13 in BiH on the best way to ensure fair trials,
and new national criminal and criminal procedure codes were
subsequently enacted that reflected European legal standards.
A new state court was created, and within that the War Crimes
Chamber came into being to try genocide, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity, together with a law regulating the use
of evidence obtained by the ICTY and transferred to Sarajevo.14

The Extraordinary Chambers
At the same time, negotiations continued for the creation
of another hybrid tribunal. In June 1997, the then Co-Prime
Ministers of Cambodia, Prince Norodom Ranariddh and Hun
Sen, wrote to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan requesting UN
7
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The Court of BiH is a permanent institution within the domestic
legal order, subject to Bosnia’s international obligations, including an appeal to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR),
making it the first war crimes court subject to the ECHR’s
jurisdiction.
For an initial transitional period there are international legal,
judicial, and administrative staff. Within five years, however,
the international staff will leave and hand the process over to
their domestic counterparts. In September 2006 a Transition
Council was created consisting of representatives from the government and the international community to ensure an effective
transition.
The Court of BiH had to work quickly. The Registry was
established in early 2005, and on September 1, 2005 the ICTY
Appeals Chamber approved the first ‘11bis’ transfer in the case
of Radovan Stanković. In the intervening period, a vast amount
of administrative work was undertaken to prepare for the first
trials. This included recruitment of administrative and legal
staff, prosecutors, and judges. Architects organized the renovation of a government building to provide office space and eight
court rooms, one of which is suitable for high security cases. A
new detention facility was built to house those under pre-trial
detention.15
The Court of BiH and the Prosecutor’s Office is partially
funded by the Ministry of Justice’s regular budget, and partially
by voluntary contributions from individual donor countries. The
government provided $4.7 million (3 million euros) in 2005 and
plans to provide approximately $15.8 million (10 million euros)
annually by 2010. A separate donor-funded budget funds the
international staff, which amounted to $15.8 million (10 million euros) in 2006, reducing to $7.9 million (5 million euros)
in 2009. National staff will increase from 125 in 2006 to 380
in 2010, whilst over the same period international staff will
decrease from 65 to 14. The real difference from all other tribunals is that with eight courtrooms and 53 judges, the Court of
BiH is able to process several hundred cases per year. This creates a pre-trial cost of approximately $708,000 (450,000 euros)
in 2006 reducing to $236,000 (150,000 euros) in 2010.16

this never happened, leading to concerns that judges are still
influenced by the government.17
Managing a new court requires unique individuals who
understand the final “product” that is being created, and who
have experience with criminal justice. Many trial lawyers and
judges with years of courtroom experience never acquired the
management skills required for such a multi-million dollar project, whereas some excellent administrators may not have necessary legal skills for negotiating with foreign judiciaries.
It may be necessary to build and equip new courtrooms.
Internationally acceptable detention facilities may not exist, so
one will have to be built. In BiH a fully-equipped building with
six courtrooms equipped for simultaneous interpretation was
built in less than a year. In Phnom Penh the ECCC has failed to
convert the one room it has into a courtroom after more than two
years in possession of the buildings, and interpretation equipment still has to be rented.

“Many experienced
individuals now work
at the ICTY and ICTR, but
there is a risk that those
who have only experienced
the luxuries of a billion
dollar budget may not
understand how the job
can be done for a fraction
of the price.”

Building A Court
Hybrid tribunals are complex to create. Even where the
proposed court is constructed within the existing legal system
it normally requires a new legal structure, new buildings, a new
budget and new staff. Once the tribunal is created, the trials
will almost certainly be the most complicated trials that have
ever occurred in that country, using techniques and concepts
unknown to domestic judges, prosecutors, and lawyers.
The long period of preparatory work requires assessing
whether there is political will for war crimes trials and persuading those who may be suspicious of such trials. If new
legislation is required, it must be passed through the national
assembly in a form that is acceptable to the international community. Diplomats who will later be invited to pay for the court
must be kept involved. Widespread consultations must take
place throughout different parts of the community to ensure full
involvement of all key players. Large-scale reforms in other key
areas may be necessary. For example, BiH instituted a largescale re-appointment process for the judiciary that improved
confidence in their independence and impartiality. In Cambodia

Staffing the Court
Staff must be recruited, not only for legal positions but also
for a broad range of administrative tasks. Systems for security,
computers, interpretation and broadcasts of the proceedings must
all be budgeted, purchased and managed. Court management
systems must be created that can deal with large paper-based
trials with hundreds of thousands of pages of evidence. These
key positions require previous experience working in a criminal
court system. Whilst UN staffers have a broad range of experience in peacekeeping missions, East Timor has demonstrated
that those skills cannot easily transfer to running a war crimes
court. Many experienced individuals now work at the ICTY and
ICTR, but there is a risk that those who have only experienced
the luxuries of a billion dollar budget may not understand how
the job can be done for a fraction of the price.
8
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Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia

There is also a phenomenon of “Rolls Royce” staffing levels.
In a domestic trial involving multiple defendants, the prosecution is normally represented in court by one or two advocates
and supported by a small team of lawyers who help prepare the
case. The defense may have two advocates, which often means
the prosecution will be outnumbered in the courtroom. This is
perfectly normal and fair. By contrast, in international criminal
trials, multiple advocates often appear for the prosecution during the course of the trial, with only one or two advocates for
each defendant. Whilst such staffing levels may make the prosecutors’ job easier, it is a luxury that is not affordable in most
domestic jurisdictions and certainly not for hybrid tribunals on
a tight budget.

Budgetary Amnesty
Where there have been violations of the right to life, human
rights law guarantees a proper investigation into the killings.
There are also significant soft law standards that support and
enhance this “right to the truth.” Human rights law, however,
specifically guarantees the right of the accused to be tried within
a reasonable time, and where the trials deal with widespread
allegations of criminal violations, it is often impossible to
reconcile the two conflicting positions. There is also a danger
that judges and prosecutors, keen to write history, bite off more
than they can chew, leading to unwieldy trials with excessive
charges that the accused may not survive. In domestic jurisdictions, prosecutors are accustomed to utilizing “sample counts”
to prove a course of conduct without necessarily having to prove
each act of the accused.
Prosecutors or investigating judges do not like to accept
constraints on their discretion. As state agents, however, they
have a duty to organise themselves in such a way as to ensure
the human rights of the accused are protected. The ECHR
has frequently stated that the state is obligated to organise its
criminal justice system to ensure the rights of the accused, and
that it must show “special diligence” in its attempts to move
the process forward. The Court has explicitly stated that delays
occasioned by a shortage of equipment or personnel might be
taken into consideration as displaying a lack of due diligence.18
Similarly, the Court has held that legal systems of member states
should be able to cope with such requirements.19
Detaining someone if there was little possibility of a trial
due to lack of funding would be an arbitrary and unlawful act. If
the budget only permits nine trials, is it acceptable under human
rights standards to arrest a tenth on the basis that money will be
found at some time in the future? Whilst with national budgets
the government may divert funds from another area, the same
does not apply to tribunals funded by voluntary contributions
from the international community. If the money is not in the
bank account in New York, no one can spend it.
Where the court will only have a limited mandate it essentially means that there is de facto impunity by way of budgetary
amnesty for all other offenders. In BiH there are approximately
13,000 police files for offenses during the war. The Court of
BiH will be able to try perhaps 5,000 people in the next ten to
15 years, with the rest being sent to lower courts. In Cambodia,
perhaps only five people will face trial. All other perpetrators
will have effective immunity.

Former Democratic Kampuchea foreign minister Ieng Sary stands for
the first time in the Pre-trial Chamber.

Staff recruitment raises a crucial question as to the extent to
which it is possible to build the capacity of under-skilled staff
whilst at the same time ensuring that the trials meet international
standards and are completed within a reasonable time. Many
observers concluded the East Timor trials were unfair. BiH
trials are required to meet the more exacting standards of the
European Convention of Human Rights, and a challenge can be
made to that Strasbourg-based court if they do not.
As a secondary benefit, hybrid tribunals can raise the quality
of justice in a country, and leave a lasting legacy. In a court such
as the ECCC it is not clear how such laudable processes can be
effective given the limited timescale and the small number of
trials that will take place. The Cambodian judges, prosecutors,
and defense lawyers will learn new skills that they can take with
them back to their ordinary practice, but there will be little direct
effect on the other courts in Cambodia. In BiH, the permanent
nature of the Court and the detailed transition may make the
skills-transfer more deeply embedded, making Court of BiH a
genuine example to other national courts.
One of the most controversial aspects of setting up a tribunal
is deciding on the different pay rates that will apply to “international” staff and those recruited locally. Some argue that all staff
should be paid the same amount for doing the same job, as at the
ICTY and the ICTR where all staff is “international.” However,
one of the advantages of a hybrid tribunal is the lower staff
cost, allowing the court to get more for its dollars. UN missions
set salary levels for local staff, as opposed to those who were
selected from a global competition for the position. In BiH, local
salary levels were close to government salaries, with local staff
being paid approximately 20 to 30 percent of a full international
salary. In Cambodia, local salaries have been set at 50 percent of
the gross UN salary, meaning that local judges, prosecutors and
lawyers are paid approximately three to four times the salary of
their counterparts in BiH. Hence the ECCC has lost many of the
financial advantages of being based in a developing country.
9
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Conclusion

Whilst the Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights is the UN authority for transitional justice, the Office of
Legal Affairs in New York takes precedence regarding tribunals. When a court is created within the domestic legal order of
a country, it is not entirely clear who would be responsible.
The two latest hybrid courts are very different. The ECCC
in Cambodia is a joint project between the UN and Cambodia,
utilizing an investigative judge system with a very fixed life
span, at a cost of approximately $35 million (22.2 million euros)
per year to run one trial court. The Court of BiH has been created
without UN involvement, as a permanent institution designed to
try many hundreds if not thousands of people, at a cost of $16
million (10 million euros) per year to run eight trial courts.
The two courts should be closely watched to establish
which model should be repeated in the future if international
justice requires domestic trials to complement the trials at the
International Criminal Court.
HRB

Courts must act within their financial limits. Domestic courts
are permanent institutions, allowing some flexibility in case
management and timing of trials. Hybrid tribunals may be working towards a date when they have to shut down, making the
financial controls more blunt.
Complex criminal trials require highly experienced staff,
whether they be administrators, court managers, prosecutors, or
defense lawyers. National criminal systems have constant pressures to cut costs, and discretion is exercised to ensure that the
appropriate cases are taken to court and tried within a reasonable
time. The huge budgets of the ICTY and ICTR have produced
unsustainable and un-repeatable models, and hybrid tribunals
may wish to look to national models to obtain the most efficient
staff.
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